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This paper quantifies the potential of foreign aid as an insurance mechanism 
against macroeconomic shocks. Within a dynamic model of aid flows between two 
endowment economies, we show that at least three-fourths of the large welfare 
costs of macroeconomic fluctuations in poor countries could be alleviated by a 
simple reallocation of aid flows across time. In developing countries subject to 
persistent macroeconomic shocks, the resulting welfare improvement is of first-
order magnitude. [JEL F35, E32, E60]
D
eveloping countries are subject to strong macroeconomic shocks. Excluding 
countries affected by civil wars, the percentage volatility of per capita con-
sumption has typically been two to six times greater in these countries than in 
industrialized countries over the past three decades. Figure 1 provides a vivid illus-
tration of this fact, by plotting the cyclical component of consumption in several 
African countries against its counterpart in the United States between 1970 and 
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2003. Based on Obstfeld (1994), Dolmas (1998), and Pallage and Robe (2003), the 
welfare cost of such consumption volatility should be one to two orders of magni-
tude greater than in industrialized countries.
Recent evidence suggests that the shocks experienced by developing countries 
are mostly exogenous (Köse, 2002) and that developing countries’ access to private 
international financial markets typically dries up precisely when their economies 
hit the doldrums (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004). Under such circumstances, 
changing the timing of foreign aid flows that average 10 percent of recipient gross 
national income—the representative figure for African countries (see Table 1)—has 
the potential for a first-order welfare impact.1 Our objective is to prove this conjec-
ture and to provide a measure of the welfare gain from switching to an aid policy 
that would aim at consumption smoothing in recipient countries.
In practice, aid has historically been given out by a large number of imperfectly 
coordinated donors, whose motives for providing aid range from poverty alleviation 
to disaster relief to growth promotion to political alliances (Alesina and Dollar, 
2000). In most developing countries, the resulting mix of foreign aid strategies is 
associated with procyclical net foreign aid inflows (Pallage and Robe, 2001; and 
Bulír ˇ and Hamann, 2003 and 2006).2 In this paper, we quantify the welfare benefit 
that would accrue to recipients if donors could coordinate on a single objective—
consumption smoothing. Our question is whether using the current foreign aid bud-
gets as an insurance device could indeed yield first-order welfare improvements in 
the recipient country.
Precisely, we quantify the potential welfare gains from changing the timing of 
foreign aid disbursements while keeping their average level constant. To keep the 
analysis transparent, we build a simple dynamic model of aid flows between two 
endowment economies with symmetric information sets: an altruistic donor coun-
try and a much poorer recipient country. Consistent with empirical evidence that 
foreign aid may not boost economic growth in practice (Easterly, 2003), we take 
each country’s endowment growth path as independent of the aid flows. We approx-
imate the fact that much of the aid to poor countries comes as outright grants by 
positing that aid is given out with no expectation of repayment. Finally, we assume 
that the donor adjusts aid flows each period to maximize a weighted average of its 
own expected utility and that of the recipient.
In this environment, the optimal aid policy is countercyclical. It does not 
merely dampen the variability of the recipient’s consumption, it massively reduces 
it. For a poor recipient country, this policy brings the very large percentage vola-
tility of per capita consumption down to the much lower level prevailing in the 
donor country. The effect of this policy on volatility in the donor country itself is 
negligible.
1Net aid inflows are a key source of external capital for poor countries. Over the past 20 years, official 
development assistance has made up between 10 and 60 percent of net capital flows to all developing 
nations; for the poorest countries, the average ratio has ranged from 50 to 90 percent (World Bank, 2002).
2Gupta, Clements, and Tiongson (2004) document that food aid is countercyclical, but only in countries 
with the greatest need for such aid. In most countries that receive food aid, food aid flows are acyclical.thE POtEntIAL Of fOREIGn AID AS InSuRAnCE
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Table 1.  Importance of Aid, 1975–2003 
(In percent)
  Average Aid-to-GNI Ratio
Benin  10.32
Botswana  5.94
Burkina Faso  13.25
Burundi  17.42
Cameroon  4.7
Cape Verde  26.94
Central African Republic  12.58
Chad  12.63
Congo, Democratic Republic of  8.15
Congo, Republic of  7.69
Côte d’Ivoire  4.86























Population-weighted mean1  7.70
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2005.
Notes: Each number corresponds to the average annual ratio of foreign aid to gross national income 
(GNI) over the period 1975–2003. Ratio data are from the 2005 World Development Indicators.
1Population-weighted mean, with weights based on 2000 population data.
To obtain quantitative estimates of the effects of this aid policy on a typical 
recipient’s welfare, we calibrate the model and numerically simulate it. We find that 
altering the timing of aid disbursements would be worth at least 0.2 percent, and 
quite possibly more than 8 percent, of permanent consumption in the recipient 
country. The magnitude of the recipient’s welfare gain varies with the assumed Stéphane Pallage, Michel A. Robe, and Catherine Bérubé
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level of risk aversion, the mean growth rate of consumption, and the magnitude and 
(especially) persistence of aggregate shocks. Strikingly, however, the fraction of the 
welfare costs of macroeconomic fluctuations that could be alleviated by merely 
changing the timing of aid flows always exceeds 75 percent. In short, changing the 
intertemporal pattern of foreign aid inflows does have the potential to create first-
order welfare improvements through better risk sharing and increased consumption 
smoothing.
We deliberately abstract from the possibility of informational asymmetries or 
agency conflicts between donor and recipient or between various constituencies in 
the donor or recipient countries.3 This approach allows us to keep the analysis 
simple despite the dynamic nature of foreign aid relationships. More important, it 
allows us to provide a quantitative sense of the full potential of using foreign aid as 
an insurance device, which has been advocated in both academic and policy circles 
in recent years.4
We are fully aware that the presence of moral hazard would likely reduce the 
extent to which it is desirable to offer insurance against macroeconomic shocks. We 
are also fully aware that implementing a countercyclical aid policy may be fraught 
with practical difficulties. Issues related to informational imperfections, however, 
arise with any insurance policy. What matters is that the insurance benefits be large 
enough. Our analysis shows that, in the presence of persistent macroeconomic 
shocks, these benefits could be of first-order magnitude.5
In the context of the ongoing debate about the apparent ineffectiveness   
of foreign aid in boosting growth and alleviating poverty, our results do not imply 
that donors should stop examining why some aid programs have worked and why 
many others have not. Neither do we suggest that donors should give up on growth 
and poverty altogether and instead focus on consumption smoothing. Rather,   
our results demonstrate that donors cannot ignore the insurance implications of 
foreign aid.
This paper is related to the large literature on the welfare gains from international 
risk sharing, which finds scope for additional risk sharing between different countries, 
mainly through financial markets and fiscal policy.6 Estimates of the unrealized wel-
fare gains from such opportunities range from moderate to massive, depending on the 
risk-sharing channel and on the modeling assumptions. Our contribution is to show 
3Several recent papers study how heterogeneous information sets or conflicts between parties can influence 
foreign aid contracts. Those papers’ main focus is on the use of foreign aid to promote specific policies in the 
recipient country (Murshed and Sen, 1995; Casella and Eichengreen, 1996; Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 
1997a and 1997b; Asiedu and Villamil, 2002; Azam and Laffont, 2003; and Svensson, 2003) or on the optimal 
allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between potential recipients (Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 2000; 
and Svensson, 2000).
4For example, Collier and Dehn (2001); Caballero (2003); and “The Poor Man’s Curse: Civil Wars,” 
2003, The Economist, Vol. 367, No. 8325.
5In that sense, our results are related to the literature on the welfare benefits of unemployment insurance 
programs, which has shown that, despite the possibility of moral hazard, it is optimal to offer generous 
unemployment benefits in a variety of model economies (Pallage and Zimmermann, 2001; and Wang and 
Williamson, 2002).
6See van Wincoop (1999) for a comprehensive review.that an existing policy instrument—foreign aid—has the potential to achieve very 
large additional welfare gains in recipient countries.
Closely related to our analysis is a contemporaneous study by Arellano and others 
(2005). These authors quantify the impact of exogenously given foreign aid flows on 
the production of tradable goods in developing countries. They also measure the wel-
fare implications of observed aid patterns by contrasting welfare levels when aid is 
volatile and procyclical versus when aid is kept constant at the mean. Like us, they 
choose not to model issues related to possible informational asymmetries between aid 
donors and recipients. Our focus, however, is different. We do not seek to identify the 
impact of foreign aid on a particular sector of the economy. Instead, our goal is to 
highlight the consumption-smoothing potential of foreign aid. Therefore, rather than 
take the aid policy as exogenous and then compute its impact on the recipient coun-
try’s economy, we take the recipient country’s aggregate consumption process as 
given and then quantify the welfare gain from fine-tuning aid disbursements to smooth 
out that consumption stream.
I.  Model
To study the insurance potential of foreign aid in a recipient country, we build a model 
of aid flows between two endowment economies—a rich donor and a poor recipient. 
Each country’s endowment growth path is taken as exogenous. We abstract from 
modeling any impact that aid might have on GDP or on GDP growth.
Of course, development assistance is the largest component of foreign aid, and 
the welfare effects of even small improvements in growth prospects are generally 
very large. One might therefore worry that, by abstracting from the development 
objective of aid, we may underestimate the cost of reallocating funds from growth 
promotion and overestimate the net benefits from a reduction in consumption vola-
tility. Such should not be the case, however, for the following reasons.
First, our approach reflects the fact that, after decades of empirical research, 
there is little consensus on whether foreign aid directly affects economic growth in 
practice (Easterly, 2003).7 Accordingly, we focus on another direct effect of aid 
flows on welfare, through consumption smoothing. That is, we ask whether foreign 
aid could have a first-order welfare impact on recipients in spite of the fact that the 
growth channel is weak. Still, we do not assume that poor countries will forever 
experience low levels of consumption; in view of the empirical evidence, we simply 
assume away the possibility that aid helps increase their growth rate.
thE POtEntIAL Of fOREIGn AID AS InSuRAnCE
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7Hansen and Tarp’s (2000) review of the early literature, for example, concludes that most empirical stud-
ies show that aid benefits growth. Yet, according to the widely cited studies by Boone (1994 and 1996), foreign 
aid is not invested but is instead fully consumed. In the same vein, Easterly (1999) and Dollar and Easterly 
(1999) argue that the links between aid and investment, and between investment and growth, are both tenuous. 
On the question of whether good economic stewardship by recipient governments might be key to foreign aid’s 
fostering growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), several recent studies based on very similar data end up with 
conflicting conclusions; see, in particular, Hansen and Tarp (2001); Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004); 
and the discussion and references in Easterly (2003). In sum, nothing is as sure as the fact that the aid-growth 
relation is at best unclear.Stéphane Pallage, Michel A. Robe, and Catherine Bérubé
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Second, several recent papers (Epaulard and Pommeret, 2003; Krebs, 2003; 
and Barlevy, 2004) have shown that accounting for the deleterious effects of 
volatility on growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; and Mobarak, 2005) substan-
tially raises estimates of the welfare cost of business cycles. If anything, by 
abstracting away from this indirect link between aid and growth, we may thus 
underestimate the net welfare effect of using aid to reduce the impact of macro-
economic volatility.
Ours, then, is a simple infinite horizon model of a donor country and a recip-
ient country (respectively, i = D, R) with time-varying endowments of a single, 
non-storable consumption good. Each country’s harvest of the good at time t, yi,t, 
is a random variable that follows a known stochastic process Φi. The donor coun-
try is strictly richer than the recipient country. We assume that ΦR and ΦD are 
independent processes, which reflects empirical evidence that there has been very 
little co-movement between consumption levels in rich and developing countries 
in any of the past four decades (Köse, Otrok, and Whiteman, 2003; and Köse, Prasad, 
and Terrones, 2003).
The representative agents in both countries are infinitely lived. Throughout 
the paper, we assume that they have constant relative risk averse (CRRA), time-
separable preferences over their own consumptions, cR and cD. This assumption 
makes analytical solutions to the donor’s problem possible. Furthermore, because 
one would expect macroeconomic fluctuations to bring about massive welfare 
costs under the alternative assumption of time-nonseparable preferences (Otrok, 
2001), this assumption guarantees that the large welfare gain estimates we obtain 
in Section IV are not merely due to our choice of utility functions. There is no evi-
dence suggesting that residents of developing, emerging, and developed economies 
exhibit different intensities of relative risk aversion (Ostry and Reinhart, 1992), so 
we posit that the donor and recipient agents have the same constant level of risk aver-































The recipient country’s representative agent derives utility solely from his own 
total consumption cR over time:







∑β , , ( )
0
1
where βR ∈ [0,1] is that agent’s discount factor. In contrast, the donor country’s 
representative agent is altruistic in that he cares about both his own consumption 
cD and that of the recipient country’s resident, cR. We posit that this altruism takes 
the form:thE POtEntIAL Of fOREIGn AID AS InSuRAnCE
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where βD ∈ [0,1] is the donor agent’s discount factor and A ∈ (0,1) is the weight 
assigned by the donor agent to his own utility.8, 9
The donor country can allocate part of its time t endowment yD,t to foreign aid 
at. We approximate the fact that much of the aid to poor countries comes as outright 
grants by positing that aid is given with no expectation of repayment.10 We assume, 
as is typically the case in practice (Prati, Sahay, and Tressel, 2003; and Eifert and 
Gelb, 2006), that the recipient country cannot save any part of these aid flows. With 
no possibility of storage, the periodic consumption levels in each country are, 
respectively, cD,t = yD,t − at and cR,t = yR,t + at.
The donor’s generosity is financially constrained in two ways. First, for each 
period, 0 ≤ at ≤ yD,t. Second, we shall calibrate the altruism parameter A in Section IV 
so that the lifetime average at/yR,t ratio is in line with its empirically documented 
counterpart. This second restriction leads to the following remarks. One, by calibrat-
ing A to past data, we are in effect positing that the donor’s preferences are time-
invariant. Two, our analysis may not apply in the long run to recipient countries that 
are growing at a much faster clip than the donor is. Accordingly, we shall assume that 
yR,t grows at the same rate as does yD,t. This simplification is without much loss of 
generality, in that our qualitative results are even stronger if we assume instead that 
the recipient’s growth rate is lower than the donor’s (which has been empirically true 
for most of the world’s poorest countries).
II.  Optimal Aid Policy
The donor’s problem is recursive and can be written as follows:
V y y max Au y a A u y Dt Rt
a
D Dt t R Rt
t
, , , , , ( )= − ( )+ − ( ) + 1 a a E V y y t D Dt Rt ( )+ ( )     ( ) + + β , 1 , 1 , ( ) 3
s.t. 0 ≤ at ≤ yD,t.
8Our analysis implicitly assumes that the two countries have equal populations or, alternatively, are 
abstractions for two groups of donors and recipient nations whose respective total populations have equal 
sizes. At first glance, this assumption might seem restrictive. In fact, it covers many individual donor-
recipient pairs, because the model is readily generalized to cases in which the recipient country’s population 
is smaller than the donor country’s. It also applies to an aggregate of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) donor economies (that is, the 22 nations that belong to the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee) on the one hand, and an aggregate of all African recipients 
on the other hand.
9All our results are robust to using Cobb-Douglas  U c c D D
t
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0    specifications of the donor’s utility.
10For example, 1975 to 1995 data from Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Servén (1999) indicate that the 
median grant element in official development assistance loans to non-oil-producing African countries 
exceeded 90 percent.Stéphane Pallage, Michel A. Robe, and Catherine Bérubé
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Aid does not affect future realizations of yD,t and yR,t, so the optimal aid rule is 
straightforward:
Proposition 1:  It is optimal for the donor to transfer to the recipient, each 
period, an amount as follows:
a a y y
A y A y
t t Dt Rt
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Proof:  The first-order condition for an interior optimum to the donor’s prob-
lem (equation (3)) is
′ + ( )





























implies the following optimal rule for foreign aid disbursements: a* t = (1 − A)yD,t 
− AyR,t. This is a special case of equation (4) with γ = 1. If γ ≠ 1, then the first-order 


















 which, given the nonnegativity condition 
on at, again yields the predicted optimal aid rule (equation (4)). 
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on aid-dependent countries, that is, 
countries for which aid flows are always positive (a* t > 0 ∀ t). From equation (4), it 
is evident that aid is positive as long as a simple condition is met: the donor’s 
endowment must be sufficiently bigger than the recipient’s. Accordingly,





















Corollary 1:  For aid-dependent countries, the optimal aid policy is counter-
cyclical from the recipient’s viewpoint.
Proof:  By definition, an aid-dependent country has a* t  > 0 ∀ t. Because 
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Of  particular  relevance  to  our  study  is  the  extent  to  which  the  aid  a*  ≡   
{a* t}t= 1,2, . . . can reduce consumption volatility in the recipient country. Intuitively, the 
donor should provide insurance to the recipient to an extent that reflects the donor’s 
income (relative to the recipient’s), altruism, and risk aversion. Proposition 1 and 
Corollary 1 together confirm this intuition. Our next proposition goes further. It shows 
that, if the recipient is aid-dependent, then the optimal aid policy does not merely 
reduce the volatility of the recipient’s consumption stream, it goes as far as equalizing 
the variability of per capita consumption in the donor and recipient countries.
Precisely, Proposition 2 focuses on a logical volatility benchmark that is famil-
iar from the literature on business cycles (Kydland and Prescott, 1982, for example): 
the standard deviation of per capita consumption expressed as a percentage of its 
mean. Let µ[XtΩt−1] and σ[XtΩt−1] denote, respectively, the mean and standard 
deviation of any random variable Xt conditional on the donor’s and recipient’s com-
mon information set at time t−1, Ωt−1. Then,
Proposition 2:  In aid-dependent countries, the optimal aid policy drives the con-
ditional volatility of per capita consumption down to that in the donor country.
Proof:  Again, by definition of an aid-dependent country, a* t > 0 ∀ t. Given 


































denote, respectively, the percentage volatility of per capita con-
sumption in the recipient and donor countries in period t conditional on the informa-
tion set Ωt−1. Given that any strictly positive optimal aid policy can be written as
a* t = (1 − δ)yD,t − δyR,t, where δ ≡ A    (γ = 1) or  δ
γ
γ γ ≡
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The last equality proves the claim. 
III.  Discussion
Although intuitive, Proposition 2 sends a powerful message to policymakers. We 
know that the massive volatility of private consumption in developing countries 
has a deleterious effect on their residents’ welfare (Pallage and Robe, 2003). 
Proposition 2 states that, without changing the actual amounts of foreign aid given 
on average, a simple reallocation of these aid flows across time has the potential to 
bring this volatility down to the much smoother ride enjoyed by rich countries. 
Given that the percentage volatility of consumption in poor countries is three to six 
times that in their developed counterparts, there is scope for cutting the former by 
at least two-thirds. This rough estimate already suggests that one cannot overlook 
the insurance power of current foreign aid budgets. We provide more precise esti-
mates in Section IV.Stéphane Pallage, Michel A. Robe, and Catherine Bérubé
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Because the volatility reduction is so massive, it is worth discussing the condi-
tions under which Proposition 2 holds. The analysis in Section II assumes that the 
donor and recipient countries are of equal size and grow at the same rate. It is easy to 
show, however, that our results carry through as long as the recipient country is poor, 
its population is not huge, and its economy is growing at most at the same rate as the 
donor country’s. Much of Africa, plus most of the poor countries in other regions of 
the Southern Hemisphere, meet these three conditions. What is more, even if the 
recipient economy eventually started catching up with the donor’s, our proposed aid 
policy would remain optimal for any time interval in which that recipient remains 
aid-dependent.
Our results show that donors could use foreign aid to drastically reduce consump-
tion volatility in developing countries. What if this volatility were caused by poor 
policy choices in the recipient country? Our results do not imply that residents in 
donor countries should subsidize policy mistakes by recipient governments. Whether 
aid should be conditioned on good recipient policies is beyond the scope of this paper, 
and our model is not appropriate to discuss this issue. However, in the poor countries 
for which our analysis is most relevant, our abstracting from aid conditionality is 
without much loss of generality in that most of the observed macroeconomic fluctua-
tions are due to exogenous shocks, such as terms-of-trade or world-price changes.11
It should be noted that adopting the aid policy a* has a negligible impact on the 
volatility of consumption in the donor country. If we focus on aid to African coun-
tries, to which our analysis plainly applies, the median ratio of foreign aid to donor 
GDP was less than 0.1 percent in the previous three decades (Pallage and Robe, 
2001). Clearly, any change in the sequencing of aid disbursements while maintain-
ing that ratio in the long run will have only a minimal impact on the volatility   
of consumption in the donor countries. We know from the literature on the welfare 
cost of business cycles that, in industrialized countries, larger changes in aggregate 
consumption volatility have only trivial consequences on local residents’ welfare, 
regardless of the model economy used to assess these welfare effects (Lucas, 1987; 
and Dolmas, 1998). Thus, even if donors had purely selfish preferences (A = 0), 
adopting policy a* or sticking to their current aid policy would make no difference 
quantitatively.12
Finally, we assume that aid cannot be stored by the recipient. Arguably, if aid 
could be saved, then the welfare benefits from the donor’s changing the timing of aid 
flows would fall. We think that our abstracting from the possibility of storage is sen-
sible. First, there are a good number of practical reasons why recipient governments 
may choose not to save any part of the aid. For example, recipients who do not spend 
all the aid they receive in any given period can expect to see future aid flows reduced, 
because they have just demonstrated a lack of absorption capacity (Prati, Sahay, and 
11Köse and Riezman (2001) show that world price shocks account for 82 percent of total consumption 
volatility in African countries. In the average developing country, that figure is 92 percent (Köse, 2002). 
These findings reinforce earlier evidence that terms-of-trade shocks are the main source of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in these countries (Mendoza, 1995).
12These welfare effects, already minor if the donor’s entire aid goes to a single recipient country, 
should be even smaller if the donor gives aid to many countries—each subject to imperfectly correlated 
macroeconomic shocks.thE POtEntIAL Of fOREIGn AID AS InSuRAnCE
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Tressel, 2003; and Eifert and Gelb, 2006). Second, and more important, if aid can 
indeed be saved in practice, then observed patterns of consumption (inclusive of aid) 
already account for storage. That is, whatever aid storage takes place in reality is 
already reflected in the observed volatility of consumption. Yet, as will become clear 
in Section IV, a policy such as the one identified in our paper (which assumes away 
the possibility of savings) yields substantial welfare gains over observed aid policies. 
We take this as further evidence that substantial amounts of aid are not being saved in 
practice.
IV.  Computing the Welfare Implications of Aid Patterns
The optimal aid rule a* of Propositions 1 and 2 is obtained under the assumption that 
donors act as a single agency and can perfectly coordinate their efforts toward the sole 
objective of providing insurance to the recipient country. In contrast, aid is given out 
in practice by many imperfectly coordinated donor agencies with a variety of motives 
for providing aid. In most developing countries, the resulting mix of foreign aid strat-
egies is associated with procyclical net foreign aid inflows. In this section, we mea-
sure the welfare gain that would accrue to a typical recipient country’s representative 
resident if the actual aid process, denoted a ˜, were replaced by the aid rule a*.
Clearly, the volatility of consumption in developing countries might have been 
much larger if foreign aid had not been received in the first place. We are not question-
ing the benefits of aid per se, but rather consider the insurance potential of current aid 
budgets. In other words, the question we ask is how much one can improve on current 
aid practices. Proposition 2 suggests that, under the aid policy derived in Proposition 
1, the volatility of consumption in the recipient country would equal that in the donor 
country. The welfare gain we wish to capture is thus the percentage increase in con-
sumption necessary for the representative agent in the recipient country to be 
indifferent between (1) a consumption stream inclusive of current aid, with volatility 
calibrated to the recipient’s observed consumption stream; and (2) another stream, 
with the volatility of donor consumption.
We follow the usual compensating variation approach and measure this welfare 
gain as the percentage consumption increase, in all states of the world and for all 
dates, that would make the recipient country’s representative agent indifferent between 
the two reference environments. In the context of our model, this computation amounts 
to computing the welfare effects of providing the agent with two alternative consump-
tion series that have a similar mean but different volatilities: c* R,t = yR,t + a* t(yD,t, yR,t) 
at the optimum, versus c ˜R,t = yR,t + a ˜t in practice.
In order to carry out these computations, we must make some assumptions about 
the stochastic processes that govern each country’s consumption stream per capita, c ˜i,t 
(i = D, R). We consider in turn two processes that are familiar from the literature on 
the welfare costs of business cycles. Because we are interested in percentage devia-
tions from trend, we work throughout with the logarithms of the relevant series.
In the first process, the natural logarithm of real per capita consumption fluctu-
ates randomly, and shocks to consumption levels are temporary:
lnc c z z N i t i i t i t z
2
i , , , , 0, . ( ) = + → ( ) ln 0 7 , with σStéphane Pallage, Michel A. Robe, and Catherine Bérubé
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We parameterize σ2
zi in equation (7) to the standard deviation of the cyclical com-
ponent of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-filtered logarithms of real per capita private 
consumption. This approach is the same as that taken by Lucas (1987) and many 
others and provides a floor for the welfare cost of macroeconomic fluctuations in an 
economy (Dolmas, 1998). This first process, thus parameterized, likewise provides a 
lower-bound estimate of the welfare gains from using foreign aid as insurance.
Let λRtoD denote the welfare gain to the recipient agent of a change in the timing 
of aid flows that reduces the percentage volatility of his periodic consumption, σZR, 
down to the donor’s consumption volatility, σZD. Likewise, let λ denote the welfare 
gain to the same recipient of eliminating all macroeconomic fluctuation, that is, of 
getting σZR down to zero. Given that our economies are characterized by isoelastic 
preferences and consumption equation (7), and given our parameterization of σZD 



























To the extent that the exogenous shocks that affect developing economies are 
persistent (Cashin, McDermott, and Pattillo, 2004) and that their impact on domestic 
consumption is not easily smoothed out (Köse, Prasad, and Terrones, 2003), equation 
(8) will significantly underestimate the welfare gain that could be achieved by using 
foreign aid to reduce consumption volatility in poor countries. A simple way to 
account for shock persistence is to consider an alternative consumption process, in 
which both the level and the growth rate of per capita consumption are stochastic:
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where gi is the mean growth rate of the series in country i. This second process 
assumes that shocks to consumption levels are persistent but shocks to the growth 
rate of consumption are not.
In a recipient economy characterized by CRRA utility and consumption equa-
tion (9), the aid policy a* effectively reduces the conditional standard deviation of 
shocks to per capita consumption from σ∈R to σ∈D. Let ηRtoD and η denote the wel-
fare gains to the recipient of reducing σ∈R to σ∈D or to zero, respectively. Both ηRtoD 
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Calibration
To further calibrate the two representative agents’ preferences, we need values for the 
recipient’s discount factor, β ≡ βR, and the common coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion, γ. Only annual consumption data are available for most developing countries, 
so we set β = 0.96 (which implies an annual discount rate of 4 percent). Our main 
conclusions are robust to using the alternative values β = 0.98 and β = 0.945. For 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ, we concentrate on values from 1 to 5—on 
the conservative end of the ranges suggested for countries in the Northern and the 
Southern Hemispheres (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Ostry and Reinhart, 1992; and 
Reinhart and Végh, 1995). Using higher values for γ only strengthens our results.
We choose an intensity for the donor’s altruism parameter, A, such that foreign aid’s 
certainty equivalent equals 5 percent of the recipient’s permanent consumption. This 
figure is conservative in light of the following facts. First, as seen in Table 1, the aid-to-
GNI ratio in Africa has averaged almost 13 percent over the past three decades. Even 
the population-weighted average, which is lower because countries with large popula-
tions get relatively less aid, is close to 8 percent.13 Second, between 1965 and 1994, the 
gross saving rate in aid-dependent countries has seldom exceeded 20 percent (Loayza 
and others, 1998), so that the population-weighted average aid-to-consumption ratio is 
approximately 10 percent. Third, in practice, aid flows are procyclical. Hence, expressed 
as a fraction of the recipient’s permanent consumption, the certainty equivalent of the 
actual foreign aid inflows is much less than the average aid-to-consumption ratio. To be 
conservative, we set this certainty equivalent at half the latter, or 5 percent.
To calibrate the parameters of consumption equations (7) and (9), we use esti-
mates from Pallage and Robe (2003). These figures are based on annual, 1968–96 
local-currency real private-consumption data for 36 aid-dependent countries in Africa 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. For equation (7), 
the σzi’s are parameterized to the standard deviation of the cyclical component of 
HP-filtered logarithms of real per capita consumption. For the donor country, we use 
σZD = 1.36 percent, the estimate for the United States. We want results for a represen-
tative recipient country, so we set σZR = 5 percent, which is the mean estimate for the 
developing country sample, and check robustness to values from σZR = 4 percent to 
13The data in Table 1, which focuses on Africa, are also in line with estimates for other periods and for 
poor countries on other continents. For example, including grants, the value of technical assistance, and 
concessional loans, Pallage and Robe (2001) document a median aid-to-GDP ratio of 8 percent for 63 aid-
dependent countries over the period 1969–95. Bulír ˇ and Lane (2004) report a similar mean aid-to-GDP ratio 
for all aid-recipient countries based on a survey of IMF country desk economists for 1998.Stéphane Pallage, Michel A. Robe, and Catherine Bérubé
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σZR = 10 percent. The latter figure might seem very high but is typical for a third of 
the African countries in the sample.14 For equation (9), we need not only consump-
tion volatility estimates for the donor and the recipient but also a mean growth rate 
estimate for the recipient. Pallage and Robe have estimates ranging from zero per-
cent to 3 percent for gR and from 3 percent to 6 percent for σ∈R. We therefore pick 
gR = 1 percent and σ∈R = 5 percent as central values, and carry out robustness checks 
with σ∈R ranging from 3 percent to 6 percent. In contrast, estimates of σ∈D do not 
vary much across donors. Consequently, we take only one value: the estimate for 
the United States, σ∈D = 1.35 percent.
Quantitative Results
Table 2 summarizes our quantitative findings for the central parameter values dis-
cussed in the calibration section: β = 0.96; γ = 1.5, 2.5, or 5; σZR = σ∈R = 5 percent; 
σ∈D = 1.36 percent and σZD = 1.35 percent. Table 2 has two panels, to differentiate 
between situations in which aggregate economic shocks are transitory (left panel) 
and cases in which these shocks are persistent (right panel).
As other papers have shown (Obstfeld, 1994; Pemberton, 1996; Dolmas, 1998; 
Otrok, 2001; and Pallage and Robe, 2003), the welfare gains from reducing con-
sumption volatility vary greatly depending on whether consumption shocks are 
temporary, as in equation (7), or persistent, as in equation (9). It is therefore useful 
to provide a benchmark for the maximum possible welfare gains from changing the 
pattern of aid flows in a typical recipient country by first quantifying, for each con-
sumption process, the welfare gain that would accrue to the recipient country’s 
representative agent if all consumption volatility were eliminated.
The first row in Table 2 shows that, when the coefficient of risk aversion is γ = 2.5 
[γ = 5], the cost of macroeconomic volatility is λ = 0.31 percent [λ = 0.63 percent] of 
permanent consumption in the first model economy (in which shocks to consumption 
levels are transitory) but that same cost skyrockets to η = 5.86 percent [η = 9.36 per-
cent] of permanent consumption in the second model economy (in which shocks are 
persistent). Even when γ = 1.5, a low value for the risk-aversion coefficient, the cost 
η is still more than 4 percent of permanent consumption.
The second row in Table 2 gives the welfare gain from optimizing the timing of 
foreign aid flows (λRtoD and ηRtoD), again expressed in terms of the recipient’s per-
manent consumption. The third row, which gives the ratio of the first two rows, 
shows that, in both model economies, more than nine-tenths (92 percent) of the 
costs of macroeconomic volatility could be eliminated by reallocating aid flows 
through time in a manner consistent with Propositions 1 and 2.
Taken together, the data in Table 2 establish that the cyclical properties of foreign 
aid flows are of first-order importance. Policymakers should be pleased to know that 
foreign aid has the potential to make a huge difference in at least one key aspect of 
life in developing countries—coping with the impact of strong aggregate shocks. 
Indeed, given empirical evidence that a less volatile economy has better growth pros-
14All these volatility estimates were computed with a weight of 10 for the HP filter and, as in other 
papers on the cost of business cycles, under the assumption that the shocks in equation (7) are independently 
and identically distributed.thE POtEntIAL Of fOREIGn AID AS InSuRAnCE
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pects (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; and Mobarak, 2005), the welfare benefits of optimiz-
ing the timing of aid disbursement could be substantially bigger still.
Robustness Checks
The results from Table 2 are robust to a wide range of alternative values for the key 
parameters, σZR, σ∈R, and γ. Figures 2, 3, and 4 provide a concise illustration of this 
robustness.
Figure 2.a plots λ and Figure 2.b plots η, for various values of the recipient 
agent’s risk aversion and of the volatility of his consumption (respectively, σZR and 
σ∈R). As anticipated, the cost estimates in Figure 2 are often substantial. They are 
especially large when macroeconomic shocks are persistent—reaching, for exam-
ple, a massive η = 15 percent of permanent consumption when consumption volatil-
ity is σ∈R = 6 percent and the level of risk aversion is γ = 5.
Across the entire range of parameter values considered, Figure 3 shows that 
typically well over four-fifths, and always more than three-fourths, of the large 
welfare costs of aggregate consumption volatility could be eliminated by replacing 
the actual foreign aid stream a ˜t with the aid process a* t  (that is, by a foreign aid 
stream of the same average magnitude but different intertemporal properties).
Figure 4 provides another benchmark for the potential costs of ignoring the 
insurance implications of foreign aid. It expresses the welfare gains from replacing 
the actual foreign aid stream a ˜ with the aid process a* of Propositions 1 and 2 (that 
is, λRtoD in Figure 4.a or ηRtoD in Figure 4.b) as a fraction of the gain from providing 
Table 2.  Consumption Volatility, Aid Timing, and Welfare
  Temporary Shocks  Persistent Shocks
  γ =1.5  γ =2.5  γ =5  γ =1.5  γ =2.5  γ =5
Consumption volatility costs  
    (percent of permanent consumption)    0.19    0.31    0.63  4.12  5.86  9.36
Gain from timing aid optimally  
    (percent of permanent consumption)    0.17    0.29    0.58  3.82  5.44  8.76
Fraction of volatility costs eliminated  
    by optimal aid timing (percent)  92.6  92.6  92.6  92.6  92.8  93.6
Source: Authors’ computations.
Notes: The first row shows the welfare costs of aggregate consumption volatility in a typical 
recipient country, expressed in terms of permanent consumption. The second row shows the welfare 
gain from replacing the actual foreign aid stream, a ˜t, with the optimal aid process, a* t of Propositions 
1 and 2 (that is, by foreign aid flows with the same mean but different cyclical properties). That gain 
is also measured in terms of permanent consumption in the recipient country. The third row gives the 
ratio of the previous two; that is, it shows the fraction of the welfare costs of aggregate consumption 
volatility that could be eliminated by replacing the actual foreign aid stream, a ˜t, with the optimal aid 
process, a* t. The data in all rows are provided for three levels of risk aversion in the recipient coun-
try (γ =1.5, 2.5, 5), under the assumption that the percentage annual volatility of consumption (σZi 
if shocks are assumed temporary, or σ∈i if they are assumed persistent) is 5 percent in the recipient 
country (i=R) and 1.35 percent (σZD) or 1.36 percent (σ∈D) in the donor country (i=D).a ˜ in the first place. We conservatively assumed in the calibration section that a ˜ is 
worth 5 percent of permanent real per capita consumption in the recipient country. 
Thus, a value of 1 on the vertical axes of Figures 4.a or 4.b means that changing   
the timing of aid is worth as much to the recipient as increasing its per capita con-
sumption by 5 percent at all dates and in all possible states of the world. Figure 4.b 
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Figure 2. Welfare Costs of Macroeconomic Volatility
(Fraction of recipient permanent consumption)
Figure 3.  Fraction of Macroeconomic Volatility Costs Eliminated by  





































Source: Authors’ computations. 
Notes: The figure plots the welfare costs of macroeconomic volatility (λ in Figure 2(a) and η in 
Figure 2(b)) in the recipient country as a percentage of permanent consumption, for typical levels of risk 
aversion (γ) and consumption volatility (σZR in Figure 2(a) and σεR in Figure 2(b)). A value of 0.01 
(1%) on the vertical axis means that the country’s representative resident would be indifferent between 
seeing all consumption volatility removed and getting an extra 1 percent of consumption in all states and 
at all dates. Figure 2(a) plots the value taken by λ in equation (8), when consumption shocks are not 
persistent. Figure 2(b) plots the value taken by η in equation (10), when consumption shocks are 











































Source: Authors’ computations. 
Notes: The figure plots, for typical levels of risk aversion and consumption volatility in recipient 
countries, the fraction of the welfare costs of macroeconomic volatility that could be eliminated by 
replacing the actual foreign aid stream a
~
t with the optimal aid process a*
t of Propositions 1 and 2 (that is, 
by foreign aid flows with the same mean but different cyclical properties). A “drop” value of 0.8 on the 
vertical axis means that 80 percent of the cost λ  (in Figure 3(a), when consumption follows equation (7)) 
or η (in Figure 3(b), when consumption follows equation (9)) could be eliminated by reallocating aid 
flows optimally through time. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) are drawn under the assumption that the percentage 
volatility of consumption in the donor country (respectively σZD or σεD) is 1.36 percent. Figure 3(b) 
assumes a mean growth rate of per capita real consumption in the recipient country of gR = 1%. thE POtEntIAL Of fOREIGn AID AS InSuRAnCE
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Figure 4. What Is Improving the Timing of Aid Worth, Compared with  
Getting Aid in the First Place?
shows that, when consumption shocks are persistent, improving the timing of foreign 
aid flows is often worth more to the recipient than receiving aid in the first place.
V.  Conclusions
“Rich countries must [. . .] pay more attention to the sudden economic 
shocks to which poor countries are vulnerable. Sudden plunges in the price 
of coffee or cotton pluck fewer heartstrings than floods or earthquakes, but 
can be much more destabilising and [make civil war] more likely. Aid should 
take such shocks into account.”15
When designing its foreign aid policy, a donor must tackle two broad questions. The 
first, from which we abstract, is the optimal allocation of aid budgets across poten-
tial recipients. The second, on which we focus, is the optimal path of disbursement 
of a given aid budget to a given recipient country. Although the first issue is prob-
ably very important, we demonstrate that the second issue cannot be dismissed.
We show that, even ignoring the possibility that economic shocks may bring about 
political mayhem or worse, merely changing the timing of aid flows could provide 
recipient countries with substantial insurance against macroeconomic fluctuations. 
At least three-fourths of the large welfare costs of aggregate consumption volatility 
in developing countries could potentially be eliminated by using current aid budgets 
to smooth aggregate consumption in these countries.











































Source: Authors’ computations. 
Notes: The figure displays, for typical levels of risk aversion and consumption volatility in recipient 
countries, the welfare gain that would accrue to residents of a recipient country if the actual foreign aid 
stream a
~
t were replaced by the optimal aid process a*
t of Propositions 1 and 2 (that is, by foreign aid flows 
with the same mean but different cyclical properties). A value of 1 on the vertical axis means that 
changing the timing of aid is worth as much as increasing the recipient’s per capita consumption by 5 
percent at all dates and in all possible states of the world.  Figure 4(a) plots the value taken by the ratio 
λRtoD/5% in equation (8), when consumption shocks are not persistent.  Figure 4(b) plots the value taken 
by the ratio ηRtoD/5% in equation (10), when consumption shocks are permanent. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) 
are drawn under the assumption that the percentage volatility of consumption in the donor country 
(respectively σZD or σεD) is 1.36 percent. Figure 4(b) assumes a mean growth rate of per capita real 
consumption in the recipient country of gR = 1%.Stéphane Pallage, Michel A. Robe, and Catherine Bérubé
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In the context of the ongoing, vigorous debate about the apparent ineffective-
ness of foreign aid in boosting growth and alleviating poverty, our results do not 
imply that donors should stop examining why some aid programs have worked and 
why many others have not. Neither do we suggest that donors should give up on 
growth and poverty altogether and instead focus on insurance. Rather, our results 
have three implications for policy and further research.
First, the insurance potential of current aid budgets is of first-order magnitude. 
Second, foreign aid is given out in practice by many donors, for many reasons. Chief 
among the latter are growth promotion and poverty reduction, plus political alliances 
and disaster relief. In most developing countries, the resulting mix of aid strategies is 
associated with procyclical net aid inflows. If the strategies that bring about aid pro-
cyclicality could be replaced by others that do not (for example, through better donor 
coordination), then the resulting welfare gains might be as large as the gains from 
receiving aid in the first place. Third, if the observed aid patterns are the outcome of 
aid contracts designed to alleviate conflicts between donors and recipients under 
asymmetric information, then our results give an estimate of the deadweight losses 
brought about by these agency conflicts.
In sum, our point is simple. We know that the welfare costs of consumption vola-
tility are very large in developing countries. Most of that volatility is the direct con-
sequence of exogenous macroeconomic shocks. Lucas (2003) rightly argues that, 
regardless of the size of its costs, one should care about consumption volatility only 
to the extent that it can be reduced by feasible policies. In this paper, we focus on a 
policy that is both feasible and widely used: foreign aid. We show that altering the 
timing of aid flows has the potential to eliminate between 75 percent and 95 percent 
of the welfare cost of the massive macroeconomic fluctuations that affect developing 
countries. The impact on consumption volatility in donor countries would be negli-
gible. In light of these results, we submit that the role of foreign aid as an insurance 
device deserves to receive much consideration.
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